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In standard macroeconomics, fiscal policy involves choices about
expenditures, taxes, and debt issue. The different kinds of public
spending may be distinguished with respect to their interactions
with private decisions. For example, some public activities influ-
ence private production and some interact with households’ choices
of consumption and leisure. Taxes may also be differentiated by
types; levies may fall on labor income, capital income, consumption,
bodies, and so on.
The fiscal authority also chooses its type of debt obligations. These
decisions include the maturity structure of the debt, whether to issue
nominal bonds or bonds indexed to either the price level or a foreign
currency, whether debt payments should be contingent on other vari-
ables such as government expenditures and the state of the business
cycle, and so on. These kinds of decisions are less familiar to macro-
economics, although some aspects have been studied by Lucas and
Stokey (1983); Persson and Svensson (1984); Bohn (1988, 1990); Calvo
and Guidotti (1990); Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini (1990); Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990); Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994); Missale and
Blanchard (1994); and Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (1996).
Optimal debt management can be conceptualized in three stages.
First, if taxes are lump sum and the other conditions for Ricardian
equivalence hold, as in Barro (1974), then the division of government
financing between debt and taxes is irrelevant. Thus the whole level
of public debt will be indeterminate from an optimal-tax standpoint.
Second, if taxes are distorting—for example, because the amount
paid depends on an individual’s labor income or consumption—then
the timing of taxes will generally matter, as in Barro (1979). This
consideration tends to motivate smoothing of tax rates over time and
thereby can make determinate the levels of debt at various dates.
However, this element does not pin down the composition of debt,
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say, by maturity. Finally, if there is uncertainty about levels of public
outlay, the tax base (for example, aggregate consumption or GDP),
and asset prices, then the kinds of debt that the government issues
will matter. In particular, the government may want to smooth tax
rates over states of nature, and this consideration may dictate an
optimal structure of the public debt. For example, it may be desirable
for debt payouts to be conditioned on the level of government spend-
ing, or it may be possible to design the maturity structure of the
indexed debt so as to insulate the government’s financing costs from
shifts in riskless real interest rates.
The strategy in this paper is to assume that the government
desires to smooth the path of taxes when confronted by a path of
exogenous, but stochastic, outlays. Other analyses, such as Zhu (1992)
and Barro (1995), show that this objective can be derived, under
some conditions, from the more fundamental objective of expected
utility maximization for the representative household. The analysis
assumes that policymakers can make effective commitments about
the form of future fiscal actions. Hence, unlike Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and Persson and Svensson (1984), the debt composition is
not set to ensure that policies are time consistent.
1. PUBLIC FINANCE WITH TAX SMOOTHING
The real public outlay for period t is Gt. This outlay is exogenous
and stochastic. The government sets its real tax revenue for period t
at the value Tt. The precise nature of the taxes is left unspecified.
However, these levies are assumed to be distorting in such a way that
the policymaker wishes to minimize the overall expected deadweight
loss, as given from the perspective of an initial date, time 0, by
       (1)
where wj > 0 represents weighting factors. The idea here is that
variations in taxes over time cause distortions that the govern-
ment would like to avoid. This objective will motivate smoothness
in Tj across time and states.1
 1. The form of equation 1 is natural for consumption taxes in the absence of a
labor-leisure choice, such that distortions reflect only variations in tax rates over
time, not the levels of tax rates. With a labor-leisure choice, terms involving the
levels of consumption or labor-income tax rates would also appear. The tax-smooth-
ing behavior considered below is sometimes optimal in this extended setting.
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If one incorporates levies on a tax base, such as income, con-
sumption, or property, then distortions are likely to increase more
than in proportion with the amount of taxes when expressed in rela-
tion to the tax base. Therefore, Tt and Gt should be construed as
ratios to the tax base. Uncertainty with regard to the tax base is
analogous to uncertainty with respect to the level of public outlays,
and a rise in Gt can be viewed alternatively as an increase in govern-
ment expenditure or a decrease in the tax base.
Indexed public debt issued at time t pays the certain real amounts
Bt1, Bt2,… in periods t + 1, t + 2,.… These payouts can represent cou-
pons or principal. The real market prices of this debt at time t are Pt1,
Pt2,.… These asset prices are taken to be exogenous and stochastic,
although the model could be extended to allow the choices of debt
policy to affect the asset prices.
The government will also wish, in this model, to issue debt with
payouts that are contingent on the realizations of Gt. The amount of
this debt issued at date 0 and due at date t can be structured so that it
pays off one unit less for each unit by which Gt exceeds its date-zero
expectation, E0Gt.2 This debt can also be set up so that it pays a (posi-
tive or negative) noncontingent amount at date t, expressed as 0E0Gt.
This amount is assumed to be set so that the market value of contin-
gent debt at date 0 is nil. That is, 0 is the premium (set at time zero)
per unit of G-contingency. The amount payable in each period t on the
contingent debt is therefore 0E0Gt + (E0Gt – Gt ). Since a high Gt
represents bad times—because high public outlay and a low tax base
will typically be associated with low consumption—and the contingent
debt pays off badly at these times, the premium 0 tends to be positive.
The government can achieve perfect tax smoothing in this
model, that is, it can minimize the sum in equation 1 by attaining
T1 = T2 = …. First, the government issues the kind of G-contingent
debt that has just been described. This issue effectively converts
the path of uncertain outlays, G1, G2,..., into a path of known outlays,
                                                             This contingent debt issue
ensures that the government’s tax smoothing will not be disturbed by
surprises in the future levels of public outlays (and tax bases).
Second, the government has to manage its noncontingent debt
to get the timing of taxes right, in other words, to ensure equal values
of Tt even when the certainty-equivalent outlays, , vary over time.
2. The debt therefore pays off badly when public outlays are surprisingly high or
when the tax base is surprisingly low. The latter contingency is analogous to the
GDP-linked bonds described by Shiller (1993).
t G ˆ
   . , 1 E ˆ , 1 E ˆ
2 0 2 0 2 01 1 0 1        G G G G138 Robert J. Barro
This problem would be simple if the future prices of noncontingent
debt, Ptj, were known with certainty at date 0, that is, if riskless real
interest rates were not subject to fluctuation. In that case, any matu-
rity structure of the noncontingent debt—for example, one-period debt—
could be used. The only concern, as in Barro (1979), would be to get the
total quantity of debt issue correct in each period. However, this proce-
dure does not work if the  Ptj are subject to uncertainty. In this case,
unanticipated shifts in these asset prices and, hence, in the
government’s refinancing costs can affect the government’s bud-
get constraint and thereby disturb the smoothing of taxes.
The quantities of noncontingent public debt of the various maturi-
ties at date 0 must satisfy the constraint
, (2)
where V0 is the total market value of government debt (plus or minus)
outstanding at date 0. This equation says that the government can
rearrange its noncontingent debt as it wishes at the going market prices
to achieve a desired distribution by maturity.
The government’s full outlay for the first period—including
the noncontingent payout B01 established at date 0—is . This
quantity is nonstochastic because the uncertainty in G1 has been
hedged by the issue of G-contingent debt. If taxes are successfully
smoothed, then the revenue in each period is the same value, T. If
there is a gap between the full outlay and revenue in period one,
then the difference must be financed by noncontingent debt issue
(plus or minus) at the prevailing prices of noncontingent debt, P1j.
However, if each of these asset prices contains an independent ran-
dom element, then any debt issues of this type will cause tax smooth-
ing to fail, because the realizations of the asset prices will have an
impact on required levels of future taxes.3 Full tax smoothing thus
requires a balance between full outlay and revenue in period one:
. (3)
Since no new debt is issued and no old debt is retired in the first
period, the full outlay for the second period is        . The same
3. The assumption here is that Ponzi games are precluded and, hence, an
effect on the government’s budget in any period must, for given public outlays, show
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reasoning as that applied to period one implies that this outlay for pe-
riod two must equal the tax revenue, T. Proceeding forward in time, the
conclusion is that the form of equation 3 must hold for every period t:
. (4)
Multiplication of both sides of equation 4 by P0t and summation
from t = 1 to  leads, after substitution from equation 2, to a formula
for T:
.
This result says that the constant flow of real taxes in each period
equals the permanent flow of spending, which includes the required
financing on the initial debt, V0, plus the permanent flow of out-
lay. The last quantity weighs each amount    by the present-value
factor, P0j. For example, if the one-period, noncontingent real inter-
est rate were the constant r, such that P0j = 1/(1 + r) j, then
Substituting the result from equation 5 into equation 3 yields the
amount of noncontingent debt of each maturity:
Hence, the amount of debt with maturity t is the difference be-
tween permanent outlay (including the financing of any initial debt)
and the certainty-equivalent outlay for period t.
Suppose, as an example, that each period has the same level of
certainty-equivalent outlay,     . In this case, the terms involving the t G ˆ
t t B G T 0
ˆ  
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outlays cancel in equation 7, and the quantity of debt for each
period is a constant, given by  4
.
One way to look at this answer, in terms of pure discount bonds, is
that the maturity structure of the noncontingent debt has no holes.5
The government arranges the debt at the outset so that the real amounts
to be paid in each future period (up to t = ) are the same.6 How-
ever, because of the discounting on future real payouts (that is, a
declining time path of the P0j), the current market value of the
outstanding debt declines steadily with maturity.
From the standpoint of coupon bonds, the government should struc-
ture its debt as indexed perpetuities (consols).7 These issues pay a
uniform and perpetual stream of real coupons but have no principal
payments.
The prescription for consols may seem to entail a maturity struc-
ture of the public debt that is much longer than that observed in
practice. When governments issue real bonds, however, the stated
maturity and, more pertinently, the average duration of the real
payouts tend to be long. For example, when Great Britain was on the
gold standard in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nominal ob-
ligations were effectively real. At that time, the public debt was mainly
long term (“funded”) and often took the form of consols.8 The U.S.
 4. If the one-period, noncontingent real interest rate is the constant r, then
B0t = rV0.
 5. This result on the desirable maturity structure of the public debt therefore
differs from the suggestion of Friedman (1959, p. 63): “I can find no valid argu-
ment for the present policy of issuing a wide variety of securities.… The alterna-
tive suggestion follows.… Issue… debt in two standard forms, one short-term…
the other moderately long-term. The short security might be a 90-day bill…. The
longer security might best be a consol—that is, a perpetuity.… A less extreme break
would be to make it, let us say, an eight- or ten-year maturity. I do not myself believe
that the precise maturity of the debt outstanding is of great significance”.
 6. Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini (1990) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) argue on
different grounds—to avoid confidence crises—that similar amounts of public debt
should come due in each period.
 7. Lucas and Stokey (1983) argue that consol debt may also be desirable on
time-consistency grounds. In some situations, this maturity structure deters the
government from making tax changes that would affect the term structure of real
interest rates.
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debt issued under the gold standard before World War I was also
primarily long term; for example, most of the U.S. government bonds
outstanding in 1916 had remaining maturities in excess of twenty years.9
Many developed countries have recently issued indexed bonds,
and these securities tend to be long term. For example, the United
Kingdom has issued indexed coupon bonds with maturities as long as
thirty-eight years, which is nearly infinity. Other countries that have
issued coupon bonds include Canada with a thirty-year maturity,
Australia with twenty years, and Israel with fifteen years (see Bank
of England, 1995). Sweden has issued discount bonds with maturities
of nineteen years (the duration of a consol would be nineteen years if
the real discount rate were around 5.5 percent). The United States,
which began to issue indexed bonds only in 1997, began with a ten-
year maturity. More generally, the observed short maturity for
public debt in modern times applies mainly to nominal bonds in the
context of a paper monetary standard.10 Nominal debt is considered
in a later section.
Returning to equation 7, if the expected outlays differ across peri-
ods, then the debt structure no longer consists precisely of consols.
A period with a high level of certainty-equivalent outlay would have a
correspondingly reduced level of debt coming due. For example, if a
war or a major building project were anticipated for period t, then
the debt would be structured at date 0 so that little debt would ma-
ture during period t. Otherwise, the government would have to bor-
row a lot in period t at a financing cost that is uncertain at time 0.
The practical relevance of this result is unclear, however, because it
depends on the government having advance information about the
future time pattern of public outlays.
If there were a positive drift in Gt—which has to be interpreted in
the model as a drift in public spending as a ratio to GDP or some
other measure of the tax base—then equation 7 calls for a negative
trend in B0t. The maturity structure of the debt would, in this case,
be shorter term than a consol.
If the ratio of public outlay to the tax base had no drift but the levels
of government spending and the tax base were each drifting upward (as
would be expected with secular growth of the economy), then the opti-
mal B0t would have a corresponding upward drift. Therefore, the
maturity structure of the debt would be longer term than a consol.
 9. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, p. 411).
10. The usually stated maturity for nominal bonds overstates the duration not
only because of the coupon payments but also because no account is taken of the
diminished real value of future payouts due to inflation.142 Robert J. Barro
2. A LIMITATION TO NONCONTINGENT PUBLIC DEBT
A striking property of the previous solution is that the govern-
ment arranges its debt obligations fully at date 0 and then never
issues or buys back debt in subsequent periods. All the government
does with respect to debt in future periods is, first, make contingent
payments based on the realizations of Gt and, second, make the pre-
viously agreed noncontingent payouts (of roughly consol form). These
findings rely on the assumption that the government can use G-con-
tingent debt effectively to convert its path of uncertain outlays into a
deterministic path. The results would be different if the government
were precluded from issuing G-contingent debt. However, the rea-
son for this preclusion would likely not be on technical grounds in-
volving the construction of the appropriate type of instrument. In
countries with sophisticated financial markets and in which accurate
national-accounts data are available without substantial delays, cre-
ating this kind of debt contract would not be a problem.
The likely source of difficulty involves moral hazard: if debt payouts
are contingent on the level of public outlay, then the government is
likely to overspend, perhaps even to fight too many wars.11 The gov-
ernment might further be tempted to manipulate the statistics on
spending to create the appearance of a contingency that warranted
poor payouts on the debt. This problem might be acute because the
relevant contingency involves not only the computation of the level of
public outlays, but also the scaling of these outlays in relation to
some concept of a tax base.
11. Such illustrious economists as Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued that
governments have an excessive tendency to fight wars when the available method of
war finance is too convenient. In their contexts, the overly convenient method of
finance was viewed as debt issue rather than current taxation, but the point about
moral hazard is the same. Smith (1791, p. 427) said, “Were the expense of war to be
defrayed always by a revenue raised within the year… wars would in general be more
speedily concluded and less wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during the con-
tinuance of the war, the complete burden of it, would soon grow weary of it, and
government, in order to humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying
it on longer than it was necessary to do so.” Ricardo (1951, pp. 186-87) pointed out that
wartime spending could be financed by taxes, borrowing, and borrowing with the
establishment of a sinking fund and then commented, “Of these three modes, we are
decidedly of the opinion that the preference should be given to the first.… When the
pressure of war is felt at once, without mitigation, we shall be less disposed wantonly
to engage in an expensive contest, and if engaged in it, we shall be sooner disposed to
get out of it, unless it be a contest for some great national interest.” Ricardo clearly
copied this idea from Smith, and it is therefore odd that Ricardo went on to point out
the economic equivalence of the three methods of paying for government spending (a
point that Smith did not seem to recognize).143 Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt
Suppose then that the government is limited to noncontingent
debt, taken here to be indexed bonds of various maturities. It would
be technically straightforward to carry out the exercise of smoothing
taxes as much as possible in the sense of the objective in equation 1
while limiting the government to the use of noncontingent debt. (For
a sketch of this exercise, see, for example, Giavazzi, 1997.) Instead of
using indexed debt that was an approximation to a consol, the gov-
ernment would want to exploit any covariance between the future Gt
and the future prices of noncontingent debt, Ptj. For example, it is
likely that a surprisingly high level of public outlay, Gt, would be asso-
ciated with high riskless real interest rates and, hence, lower-than-ex-
pected values of Ptj. Moreover, this effect tends to be greater at longer
maturities, where asset prices are more sensitive to changes in real
discount rates. (This effect also depends on the extent to which a
current surprise in Gt signals a long-term change in the level of pub-
lic outlays.) The likely conclusion is that the government could use-
fully hedge some of the uncertainty in the Gt by tilting the maturity
structure toward more long-term debt and less short-term debt (or
even toward the holding of short-term assets). The optimal maturity
structure would thus tend to be even more long term than the consol
structure derived before.
This kind of analysis would be valid if the rationale for the omis-
sion of G-contingent debt were technical problems in setting up the
right kinds of financial contracts. In this case, it might be desirable to
create the G-contingency indirectly by exploiting the covariance
between Gt and some other variable, such as the Ptj, for which con-
tingencies were feasible (in the case above by selecting the maturity
structure of the noncontingent debt).
The argument is invalid, however, if—as seems plausible—the
main reason for the omission of the G-contingent debt involves moral-
hazard problems of the sort described above. In that case, the same
moral-hazard problem arises when the contingency on Gt is attained
indirectly. For example, if the maturity structure of the noncontingent
public debt were skewed toward the long end, and if an increase in Gt
tended to depress the prices of long-term debt relative to short-term
debt, then the government would still have an excessive incentive to
spend, including to fight too many wars. (The government would not
have an incentive to overstate the statistics on Gt, however, unless
the asset prices reacted to the stated values of the Gt rather than to
the actual values.)
If the moral-hazard problem is so serious that it motivates the
government to explicitly use G-contingent debt to a zero extent, then144 Robert J. Barro
it seems that it would also motivate the government to indirectly use
G-contingent debt to a zero extent. That is because the indirect con-
tingency has the same moral-hazard problem but is otherwise less
efficient than the direct method. For example, the indirect contin-
gency achieved by skewing the maturity structure of noncontingent
debt toward the long end has the problem of making the government’s
future financing costs sensitive to shifts in Ptj that are independent
of the movements in Gt. The avoidance of this sensitivity was the
rationale for the consol financing in the first place.
Thus my conjecture is that the full solution to the model with
moral hazard—when this hazard is sufficient to preclude G-con-
tingent debt issue—is that the government will also optimally avoid
the exploitation of the covariance between Gt and Ptj. To avoid this
exploitation, the government will have to maintain the maturity
structure of the indexed debt that was optimal when G-contingent
debt was available, that is, the consol-type structure.
Even if the last conjecture is correct, the preclusion of G-contin-
gent debt is important because it implies that the government will
have to react to the realizations of Gt by altering the amount of debt
outstanding. For example, a surprisingly high level of public outlay, as
in a war, will be accompanied by the issue of new consol debt, whereas
surprisingly low levels of outlay will cause retirement of outstanding
debt. This form of action describes pretty well the observed behavior of
the British government over more than two centuries (see Barro, 1987).
3. NOMINAL BONDS
Suppose now that the government can issue nominal debt with
varying maturities. Let b0j be the nominal amount committed in pe-
riod 0 to be paid in period j and p0j the associated time 0 real market
price of these bonds. The real value of the future payouts depends on
the realizations of future price levels. Future real prices of the nominal
bonds, ptj, depend on the price level for period t and on the prospects at
time t for future inflation and real interest rates, which together deter-
mine nominal discount rates.
The probability distribution for inflation is treated here as ex-
ogenous to the government’s fiscal choices, and the distortions
caused by inflation are assumed not to interact with those of other
taxes. Bohn (1990) also takes this approach.145 Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt
The stochastic properties of inflation are assumed to reflect
some empirical regularities. One of these regularities, applicable
to the paper monetary standards of modern times, is that innova-
tions to inflation are highly persistent. In fact, the inflation rate is
close to being nonstationary in post-World War II data, say for the
United States and the United Kingdom.
Another apparent regularity is that innovations to inflation tend
to signal bad times ahead in the long run. U.S. quarterly data from
1957 to 1994 reflect this pattern: the contemporaneous correlation of
a measure of unexpected inflation with the real return on the stock
market is negative and surprisingly large in magnitude (–0.4).12 In
contrast, the short-term relation between the inflation rate and real
GDP tends to be positive; that is, inflation is mildly procyclical.13
An additional feature of inflation is its positive correlation with
wartime spending, especially for such large conflicts as World War
I, World War II, and the Napoleonic Wars (see Barro, 1987). How-
ever, for the moderate fluctuations of government spending that
show up in the U.S. data since World War II, there is no significant
relation between innovations to inflation and movements in govern-
ment expenditure.
The issue of nominal public debt would be a mistake in the model
described at the outset, in which G-contingent and indexed debt
instruments are available. Unanticipated inflation and unanticipated
changes in the future prices of nominal debt cause fluctuations in
financing costs, which would create unnecessary variations in taxes
and thereby generate some departure from perfect tax smoothing
in the sense of the objective in equation 1.
If indexed bonds are unavailable and the government is therefore
forced to issue nominal bonds, then the maturity of the nominal debt
could be designed to hold down fluctuations in taxes. Since innovations
to inflation tend to persist, the prices of long-term nominal bonds
would be more volatile than those of short-term bonds. Therefore,
12. The series on expected inflation comes from an autoregression moving aver-
age (ARMA) process with deterministic seasonals for consumer price index (CPI) in-
flation, with the estimated coefficients updated each quarter to use only lagged data.
The inflation rate is computed from monthly, seasonally unadjusted values of the CPI
for January, April, July, and October. Real stock returns are the growth rate of the
Standard and Poor’s 500 index less CPI inflation plus the Standard and Poor’s 500
dividend yield.
 13. The departure of the price level from its trend, however, tends to be
countercyclical. See Kydland and Prescott (1990) and Barro and Grilli (1994, pp.
14-15).146 Robert J. Barro
the greater the volatility and persistence of inflation, the more the
government would shift toward short-term issues to minimize the
effect of unanticipated inflation on financing costs.
In the United States, for example, the average maturity of the
public debt (weighted by nominal amounts of principal outstanding)
fell from around nine years in 1946 to less than three years in 1976,
then returned to five to six years in recent times.14 It seems reason-
able that these changes were caused by shifts in the variance of infla-
tion, which was low from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, high until
the mid-1980s, and low again in recent years. Although a shortened
maturity of the public debt is a sensible response to more volatile
inflation (given that the debt takes a nominal form), this shift also
makes the government’s refunding costs more sensitive to move-
ments in real interest rates. The whole point of the use of indexed
consols in the original model was to leave the government’s fi-
nancing expenses—and, hence, its path of real taxes—invariant
with changes in riskless real interest rates. This insulation is elimi-
nated by a reliance on short-term nominal (or real) debt.15
Bohn (1988, 1990) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) argue that nomi-
nal debt may be a desirable form of funding because of the covariance
of inflation with other variables, such as Gt in the present model. The
usual idea is that a high Gt tends to go along with high inflation. This
pattern partly reflects the positive correlation between inflation and
government spending (especially apparent for large wars) and partly
the negative correlation between inflation and long-run economic ac-
tivity (and, hence, the tax base). Since nominal bonds pay off badly in
real terms when inflation is surprisingly high, this kind of debt has
some of the characteristics of the G-contingent debt that was consid-
ered before. For example, the presence of nominal bonds allows the
government to effect partial default via inflation during wartime.
The covariance between inflation and Gt would be of no advantage
and would provide no case for nominal public debt issue if G-contingent
debt were already available and exploited. However, if this type of debt
were precluded, then it might seem worthwhile to issue nominal bonds.
 14. See Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President
(1966, 1997).
 15. The significance of this lost insulation depends on the volatility of riskless
real interest rates. From an empirical standpoint, the extent of this volatility can
be gauged from the U.K. experience with indexed government bonds. From 1982
to 1995, the two-year-ahead real forward rate (for the subsequent six months)
ranged from around 2 to 5.5 percent, whereas the rate twenty years ahead varied
from about 2.5 to 4.5 percent.147 Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt
The gain from the negative covariance of the real returns on these
bonds with Gt might outweigh the costs from independent variation
in inflation, which would generate volatility in the real returns on
nominal debt and thereby adversely affect the stability of real taxes.
The problem with this line of argument is the same as the one
that arose in the previous discussion of the maturity structure of
indexed bonds. If the reason for the exclusion of G-contingent debt is
moral hazard, then this same problem arises for indirectly G-contin-
gent debt. In the previous section, therefore, it did not seem desir-
able to skew the maturity structure of indexed bonds to create a
negative covariance between Gt and the government’s financing costs.
Similarly, it seems inadvisable to use nominal debt as another way to
generate a negative covariance between Gt and financing costs. Nominal
debt seems always to be inferior to explicitly G-contingent debt be-
cause it entails the same moral hazard but also introduces unneces-
sary randomness in real financing costs and, hence, in real taxes.
One way to generate a role for nominal government bonds is to
assume that the government is already involved with nominal obliga-
tions in some other way. For example, the government has nominal
monetary obligations outstanding. Surprise increases in inflation (likely
engineered by the monetary authority) benefit the government’s bud-
get by depreciating the outstanding real cash balances and perhaps
by signaling a higher prospective flow of seigniorage income. But then
the government would have to hold nominal assets—not debts—to
offset this effect and thereby insulate the overall budget situation
from surprise inflation.16 Similarly, if the indexing of government
bonds involves a lag in the formula—that is, if the adjustments of
nominal coupons and principal are based on lagged inflation—then
the government effectively already has some nominal debt outstand-
ing. The way to offset this exposure of real obligations to inflation
would be for the government to hold some other nominal assets.
A rationale for a positive quantity of nominal government bonds
along these lines would require the government to have other out-
standing claims that suffer in real value when inflation is surprisingly
high. The tax system can have this feature under some circumstances,
especially if liabilities are specified in nominal terms and taxpayers have
opportunities for delaying payment to the government. Then the
 16. Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) argue that insulating the govern-
ment’s budget constraint from surprise inflation can also be desirable on time-consis-
tency grounds, that is, to deter the government from engineering surprise changes in
inflation.148 Robert J. Barro
nominal public debt could be an instrument that keeps the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint invariant overall with shocks to
inflation. In this case, however, the previous analysis of indexed and
G-contingent debt would be fully separable from the behavior of in-
flation and nominal debt. In particular, the consol form of indexed
financing would still be desirable.
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This paper has analyzed public debt management from an optimal-
tax perspective. The approach seems inevitably to favor indexed bonds
that have long, consol-like durations. One might be able to explain the
observed tendency for indexed debt to be shorter term than consols by
allowing for the potential of government default.
The analysis suggests little role for nominal government bonds,
except perhaps as devices to offset other kinds of nominal exposure
that the government possesses. One might possibly go further here by
introducing commitment problems into the optimal-tax problem, but it
is hard to see how these considerations will favor the use of nominal
public debt.
One possible reaction to these results is that the case for nominal
government bonds must rely not on orthodox public-finance consider-
ations, but rather on short-run macroeconomics, which is often thought
to have something to do with sticky prices. This is reassuring: to un-
derstand the desirable role for nominal government bonds one has only
to understand macroeconomics and business fluctuations.149 Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt
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